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Abstract 
This paper aims to show that art and film can operate as propaganda in subtle and 
unintentional ways.  Jacques Ellul called such propaganda “sociological propaganda.”  
Recent work in philosophy has relied on the notion of intention in defining how 
propaganda works to affect the beliefs and attitudes of its recipients.  This paper argues 
that intention is not a necessary condition for messages to be propagandistic and works to 
decouple propaganda from intention.  Because our current models rely on intention in 
defining propaganda, recent work in philosophy cannot account for sociological 
propaganda.  Ellul’s gestures toward defining propaganda explicitly feature intention as a 
component.  Sheryl Tuttle Ross’s “epistemic merit model” of propaganda relies on 
intention in its definition of propaganda.  Similarly, Jason Stanley implicitly relies on the 
notion of intention in defining the two types of propaganda in his book How Propaganda 
Works.  Decoupling propaganda from intention does not mean that any influential 
message counts a propaganda; instead, a systematic connection must hold between the 
message’s production and its effects.  Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky’s political 
economic model of propaganda outlines one of the ways this systematic connection is 
instantiated, but there are many others.  Additionally, this paper explores what 
phenomenon Jacques Ellul means to capture by the term “sociological propaganda” and 
offers a pointed definition of the term.  Finally, this paper will draw from the work of Rae 
Langton and Caroline West to advance a mechanism for how sociological propaganda 
works.  Sociological propaganda works through a process of accommodation whereby the 
audience adopts certain attitudes in order to understand the received image as a logically 
coherent message.  Accommodation relies on authority to be successful.  As long as they 
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take art and film to be authoritative, recipients risk adopting and reinforcing the attitudes 
undergirding the piece.  
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Looking Past the Images:  Art and Film as Propaganda Apparatuses 
Introduction 
 In an episode of the sitcom Just Shoot Me, Maya Gallo, the series’ protagonist, 
convinces her boyfriend that they should try and befriend a couple they recently met at a 
restaurant.  “I want my life,” she says, “to be like those beer commercials.” (Gara, 2000)  
Gallo relays aspirations of groups of friends enjoying a campfire together.  What sense 
can we make of Gallo’s report of the origin of her desire?  While it seems uncontroversial 
that a beer commercial can inculcate a desire for beer, can a beer commercial inculcate a 
desire for a particular lifestyle? 
 If we take Gallo’s report seriously, we must answer yes.  The art and film 
(including television commercials) that we consume can influence our ideas, beliefs, 
attitudes, and behaviors in subtle and unintentional ways.  In his 1973 book Propaganda:  
The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, Jacques Ellul names this phenomenon “sociological 
propaganda.”  Recent philosophical work on propaganda has neglected this phenomenon.  
Importantly, because recent propaganda models have the notion of intention built into 
them, the models cannot account for this unintentional propaganda.  This paper will seek 
to decouple propaganda from intention in order to establish sociological propaganda as a 
phenomenon worthy of consideration. 
 Removing intention as a criterion for propaganda does not mean that any message 
that exerts influence counts as a piece of propaganda; rather, a systematic connection 
between the production of the message and the message’s effects must exist.  The 
message “operates” to produce changes in attitudes or behaviors.  Edward S. Herman and 
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Noam Chomsky’s (2002) political economic model of propaganda outlines one of the 
ways this operation occurs. 
 In order to understand the phenomenon of sociological propaganda, we must 
explain the mechanism by which a work of art or a film, such as a beer commercial, can 
inculcate such ideas without intending to do so.  Here, the work of feminist philosopher 
Rae Langton will be particularly useful.  By drawing together various threads from her 
work on explaining how pornography subordinates and silences women, I will articulate 
a mechanism for how sociological propaganda works.  Whether as explosive as a 
Hollywood action picture or as benign as a commercial for a candy bar, art and film have 
the capacity to exert profound influence upon our ideals, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors 
in subtle and unintentional ways. 
 In this paper, I will accomplish four things.  First, I will challenge current models 
of propaganda by decoupling propaganda from intention.  In other words, I will show that 
messages can be propagandistic unintentionally.  Second, I will argue that removing 
intention from our propaganda models does not mean any influential message counts as 
propaganda; rather, a systematic connection must exist between a message’s production 
and its effects.  Herman and Chomsky’s political economic model of propaganda outlines 
one of the ways this systematic connection might hold.  Third, I will explain what 
phenomenon Ellul means to capture by the term “sociological propaganda,” and I will 
define it as decentralized messages that unintentionally operate to affect the behavior or 
attitudes of an individual by irrational means.  Fourth, I will draw together threads from 
Rae Langton’s work on pornography in order to develop a model for how sociological 
propaganda works.  In short, sociological propaganda works via a process of 
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accommodation whereby recipients adopt certain attitudes in order to make sense of the 
image.  I will conclude the paper with a few remarks on the importance of media literacy 
and with some directions for future research. 
I.  Decoupling Propaganda from Intention 
 Philosophers have advanced many models of propaganda that rely on intention.  
This section examines three:  Jacques Ellul’s (1973) gestures toward a definition of 
propaganda, Sheryl Tuttle Ross’s (2002) epistemic merit model of propaganda, and Jason 
Stanley’s (2015) supporting-undermining propaganda dichotomy.  I will examine each 
one in turn.  Using pornographic images as an example, I will show that intention is not a 
necessary component for propagandistic messages. 
 In his 1973 book Propaganda:  The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, Ellul does not 
provide a pointed definition of propaganda, and in fact, he is critical of such an endeavor.  
“[Many writers],” he writes, “establish a certain image or definition of propaganda, and 
proceed to the study of whatever corresponds to their definition […]” (1973, xii)  Ellul 
does gesture toward a definition of propaganda.  He concerns himself with understanding 
propaganda as a method and a set of techniques.  “In propaganda,” he writes, “we find 
techniques of psychological influence combined with techniques of organization and the 
envelopment of people with the intention of sparking action.” (xiii)  He provides the 
following rudimentary definition: 
Propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that 
wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a 
mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological 
manipulations and incorporated in an organization. (1973, 61) 
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Intention features prominently in both of these definitional gestures.  In the first, Ellul 
says propaganda has “the intention of sparking action.”  In the second, a group employs 
the methods of propaganda with the intention of bringing about “active or passive 
participation.”  I hope to show in this paper that intention is not a necessary component of 
propaganda, i.e. that propaganda can be unintentional.  If, as I suppose, intention is not 
necessary for messages to be propagandistic, Ellul’s definitional gestures are incorrect. 
 Next, I turn to Sheryl Tuttle Ross’s epistemic merit model of propaganda.  
According to Ross, propaganda occurs when the following four necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions are met: 
(1)  an epistemically defective message 
(2)  used with the intention to persuade 
(3)  the beliefs, opinions, desires, and behaviors of a socially significant 
group of people 
(4)  on behalf of a political organization, institution, or cause.  (2002, 25) 
The second prong of Ross’s framework relies on intention in order to capture the 
phenomenon of propaganda.  But, according to Ross, the intentions behind the creation of 
a work of art are not what we should evaluate.  “When we evaluate the artwork,” she 
writes, “we need to evaluate not only the conditions of its making, but also the conditions 
of its use […] The intentions in a given use of art (or particular context) help determine 
whether or not it’s propaganda.” (2002, 25) 
 Consider, as a toy example, a particularly egregious racial caricature created with 
the intention of inciting violence against the group of people the caricature is said to 
represent.  The caricature is clearly a piece of propaganda according to the epistemic 
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merit model.  Now, imagine the victims of this caricature plaster their neighborhoods 
with it in order to incite the caricature’s victims against the caricature’s creators.  Even 
though the caricature is being used in a way that contradicts its creators’ intentions, the 
caricature still functions as a work of propaganda.  We must look at the intention of a 
work of art’s deployment in evaluating whether a work of art functions as propaganda. 
 Finally, let us look at the propaganda model advanced by Jason Stanley in his 
2015 book How Propaganda Works.  Stanley defines two types of propaganda which 
“together exhaust the category of propaganda”: 
Supporting Propaganda:  A contribution to public discourse that is 
presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to 
increase the realization of those very ideals by either emotional or other 
nonrational means. 
Undermining Propaganda:  A contribution to public discourse that is 
presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to 
erode those very ideals.  (2015, 53) 
A couple examples may help clarify.  Both of these examples come from Stanley. 
 As an example of supporting propaganda, consider a ministry of health that 
produces messages discouraging citizens from smoking cigarettes (Stanley, 2015, 59).  A 
real example would be the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ “The Real 
Cost” anti-smoking campaign.  One of their messages depicts an insect eating a 
radioactive-looking soup; then, it keels over.  The following caption accompanies the 
image: 
Hydrogen Cyanide:  Found in Insecticide and Cigarette Smoke (2018) 
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The message does not use facts and argumentation about the harms of smoking in order 
to convince it recipients to refrain from the activity; rather, the message relies on the 
intuitions of the audience to conclude that something that harms insects must be harmful 
to humans.  This does not accord with our collective understanding of chemistry.  
Differences in physiology can lead to differences in toxicity.  Take, for example, 
theobromine, a chemical in chocolate.  Dogs and cats metabolize the compound about 
five times more slowly, thus accounting for chocolate’s increased toxicity for those 
animals.  In contrast, the average ten-year-old child would have to consume 16.3 pounds 
of dark chocolate to die from theobromine intake (Pomeroy, 2013).  The anti-smoking 
message presents itself as embodying the ideals of public health, and if it is successful in 
getting people to stay away from cigarettes, the message increases the realization of the 
ideal of public health.  As such, the message is supporting propaganda. 
 One of Stanley’s examples of undermining propaganda is the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2015, 61).  
The Court presented its decision as an extension of free speech rights to corporations, but 
because of the large influx of money and moneyed-interests into political campaigns, the 
free speech of common citizens has been diluted.  The net effect has been a reduction in 
the ability of common citizens to voice their political opinions.  Thus, the decision 
undermined the ideal it purported to support. 
 Unlike Ellul’s definitional gestures and Ross’s epistemic merit model, Stanley’s 
framework does not feature an explicit notion of intention, but an implicit notion of 
intention undergirds his definitions.  According to Stanley, both supporting propaganda 
and undermining propaganda are contributions to public discourse that are “presented as 
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an embodiment of certain ideals.” (2015, 53)  The contributions either increase or erode 
the realization of those ideals.  Because the contribution to public discourse is presented 
as embodying certain ideals, the contributor must intend to make a statement regarding 
those ideals.  This is not to say that the contributor intends to make a propagandistic 
message; that the contributor’s message is propagandistic could be unintentional.  But, in 
order for a message to be presented as the embodiment of a particular ideal, the 
contributor must intend for that message to be statement about that ideal. 
 How can these three frameworks deal with the phenomenon of pornography?  
Susan Brownmiller calls pornography “the undiluted essence of anti-female propaganda.” 
(1980, 32)  Beverly LaBelle argues that pornography “functions as a type of propaganda 
for male-supremacist attitudes.” (1980, 174)  Here, pornography is taken to be distinct 
from erotica.  Pornography is defined as graphic and sexually explicit subordination of 
women through images or words, whereas erotica is any sexually explicit material 
(Langton, 1990, 332).  If we take Brownmiller and LaBelle at their words, can any of the 
three frameworks help us understand how pornography functions as a type of 
propaganda?  I will examine each one in turn in order to see whether and how they can 
accommodate pornography as a type of propaganda. 
 Under Ellul’s framework, pornography does function as a type of propaganda.  
Recall that two of the hallmarks of Ellul’s definitional gestures are techniques of 
psychological influence and the intention of sparking action.  Pornography does exert 
influence on its viewers in order to spark a particular action.  Pornography employs 
sexually explicit images in order to facilitate the orgasms of its viewers.  But, this fails to 
capture what Brownmiller and LaBelle mean when they say pornography is propaganda.  
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Their claim is not that pornography is propaganda in that it facilitates the sexual 
gratification of its viewers; they claim that pornography is propaganda because it 
inculcates anti-female ideas within its recipients.  If the makers of pornography did not 
intend for these ideas to be spread by their work, Ellul’s framework cannot account for it 
as a type of propaganda. 
 Can Ross’s framework help us understand how pornography functions as a type 
of propaganda?  If propaganda spreads male-supremacist attitudes, it must surely do so in 
an epistemically defective way.  After all, pornography makes no arguments.  
Pornography, then, meets the first criterion of Ross’s framework.  The second criterion is 
the intention to persuade.  Does pornography have the intention to persuade its viewers to 
change their attitudes?  Does it intend to inculcate anti-female beliefs?  The answers to 
these questions seem to be a resounding no.  Pornography seeks to provide a means of 
sexual gratification.  Any attitudes inculcated are merely unintended byproducts.  We 
must remember, though, that the intention to be analyzed is not only the intention behind 
the work’s creation but also the intention behind its use.  Can this nuance help us 
characterize pornography as propaganda?  If a pornographic work is used in a campaign 
espousing the submissiveness of women, that work of pornography, according to Ross’s 
model, becomes a work of propaganda.  The intent we should be concerned with in our 
evaluation is the intention of the work’s use.  But, this does not capture what 
Brownmiller and LaBelle mean when they say pornography is propaganda.  Their claim 
is not that pornography is used to advance an anti-female agenda; rather, their claim is 
that pornography, in its common usage, works as anti-female propaganda.  If 
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Brownmiller and LaBelle are right, Ross’s framework cannot account for this 
phenomenon. 
 Finally, let us examine how Stanley’s framework might help us understand 
pornography as a type of propaganda.  The core of Stanley’s notion of propaganda are 
contributions to public discourse that are presented as the embodiment of certain ideals 
and that affect, either positively or negatively, the realization of those ideals.  We must 
ask, then, of which ideals pornography is presented as the embodiment.  In order for 
pornography to be considered anti-female propaganda, as Brownmiller and LaBelle have 
asserted, pornography, under Stanley’s framework, would have be presented as the 
embodiment of anti-female ideals and increase the realization of those ideals, or it would 
have to be presented as the embodiment of pro-female ideals and erode the realization of 
those ideals.  Pornography is presented as the embodiment of neither ideal.  In fact, 
pornography is presented as sexual fantasy.  Any effects it has on attitudes towards 
women are unintended byproducts. 
 If pornography functions as anti-female propaganda and if, as I suppose, it does 
so unintentionally, the propaganda models of Ellul, Ross, and Stanley cannot account for 
pornography as a type of propaganda.  Ellul’s definitional gestures and Ross’s epistemic 
merit model explicitly cite intention as a necessary component of propaganda.  Stanley’s 
dichotomy relies on an implicit notion of intention.  We need a model of propaganda 
divorced from intention.  In the third section of this paper, I will advance a framework for 
a type of propaganda that functions unintentionally.  This “sociological propaganda” can 
account for the subtle and unintentional ways art and films, including beer commercials 
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and pornography, can influence their audiences.  In the next section, I examine one of the 
problems that arises in divorcing intention from propaganda. 
II.  The Systematic Connection between Production and Effects 
 If pornography unintentionally functions as propaganda, then our notion of 
propaganda must be divorced from intention, i.e. messages can be propaganda by 
accident.  Divorcing intention from propaganda seems like a risky move.  Does this mean 
that any message that causes us to change our behaviors or beliefs in an irrational way 
constitutes a propagandistic message?  If this were the case, then almost any message 
could be propaganda, and this over-application of the term would quickly erode its 
meaning.  To avoid this problem, I propose that for a message to be propaganda, a 
systematic connection between the message’s production and its effects must hold.  
Herman and Chomsky’s (2002) political economic model of propaganda highlights one 
of the ways this systematic connection can be instantiated. 
 In their 2002 book Manufacturing Consent:  The Political Economy of the Mass 
Media, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky advance a political economic model of 
propaganda.  Focusing on the U.S. news media, Herman and Chomsky outline five news 
filters: 
(1)  The size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation 
of the dominant mass-media firms; 
(2)  advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; 
(3)  the reliance of the media on information provided by government, 
business, and “experts” funded and approved by these primary 
sources and agents of power; 
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(4)  “flak” as a means of disciplining the media; and 
(5)  “anticommunism” as a national religion and control mechanism.  
(2002, 2) 
The size, concentrated ownership, and owner wealth crowd out smaller voices and 
disincentivize publishing information that upsets the current economic status quo.  The 
media’s reliance on advertising prevents the media from publishing stories that alienate 
advertisers.  The media’s reliance on government, business, and expert personnel for 
primary source information keeps the media in fear of being cut off from these 
information streams.  The media must also be wary of upsetting large special interest 
groups who can exert their influence by instituting boycotts of media firms and, thereby, 
drive away advertising dollars.  These filters limit what information gets distributed 
through the news media: 
The raw material of news must pass through successive filters, leaving 
only the cleansed residue fit to print.  They fix the premises of discourse 
and interpretation, and the definition of what is newsworthy in the first 
place, and they explain the basis and operations of what amount to 
propaganda campaigns.  (Herman & Chomsky, 2002, 2) 
Unlike the models I outlined above, Herman and Chomsky’s political economic model of 
propaganda does not rely on intention, but this is not surprising.  Their enterprise is not to 
explain characteristics of propagandistic messages but to explain how structural realities 
of the media give rise to media biases. 
 Herman and Chomsky’s filters give rise is unintentional propaganda.  By 
marginalizing information, opinions, and stories that cannot make it past the five filters, 
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dissenting voices become silenced.  This marginalization is not the result of the intentions 
of one centralized force; rather, the marginalization results from multiple parties exerting 
their influence on the dissemination of information.  As a result, the consumers of news 
media reach an irrational conclusion – they consider alternative views as non-existent or 
non-viable simply due to their silence. 
 If Herman and Chomsky’s political economic propaganda model is correct, they 
have shown how structural features of the media industry can lead to the production of 
messages that affect the attitudes of their recipients in subtle and unintentional ways.  
What their model offers, then, is neither a taxonomy of propaganda types nor a 
mechanism for how propaganda works; rather, their model provides a set of structural 
features that cause propaganda in the news media. 
 The systematic connection between the production and the effects of propaganda 
is not limited to the political economic model outlined by Herman and Chomsky.  Let us 
return to Maya Gallo’s beer commercial, with which I started the paper.  The beer 
commercial clearly works as intentional propaganda; advertisers created the message 
with the intention of selling beer.  But, the message also has some unintentional effects:  
the message inculcates the desire for a certain way of life, one which includes camping 
trips with friends.  The images included within the beer commercial are intended to 
support the project of selling beer, and they do so by preying on the tastes, fears, desires, 
and aspirations of the target demographic.  As a result of including these images, the 
ideas upon which they are built are reinforced and spread within the commercial’s 
recipients. 
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 Let us return to the example of pornography.  Pornography presents itself as 
sexual fantasy to aid in the sexual gratification of its viewers, but to be effective, it must 
be responsive to the attitudes and fantasies of its target audience.  As a result, these 
fantasies and the attitudes that undergird them get inculcated and reinforced within the 
viewers.  For example, a pornographic film that depicts a favorable rape depiction may 
simply seek to give a visual representation to a sexual fantasy, but it also operates to 
inculcate and reinforce problematic ideas about rape within its audience. 
 In summation, divorcing propaganda from intention does not mean that any 
message that exerts influence on its recipient constitutes a propagandistic message.  A 
systematic connection must hold between the production of the message and that 
message’s effects.  Herman and Chomsky’s political economic model of propaganda 
outlines one of the ways that systematic connection can be instantiated, but there are 
others.  In projecting the tastes, desires, and aspirations of their target demographic, 
advertisements, including beer commercials, operate to inculcate these attitudes within 
their viewers.  Similarly, by projecting the sexual fantasies of their audience, 
pornography operates to inculcate the problematic beliefs that undergird those fantasies.  
Having decoupled propaganda from intention and having posited a systematic connection 
between the production and the effects of propaganda messages, the paper will now turn 
to its third task:  defining sociological propaganda. 
III.  Sociological Propaganda Defined 
 In the previous section, I argued that decoupling propaganda from intention does 
not necessarily lead to a notion of propaganda that is too broad to be useful.  This section 
presents a model for a type of propaganda divorced from intention yet still limited in 
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scope through the necessity of a systematic connection between production and effects.  
Despite the flaws in his definitional gestures, Ellul laid the groundwork for this type of 
propaganda.  Following Ellul, I will call it “sociological propaganda.” 
 According to Ellul, sociological propaganda is “the penetration of an ideology by 
means of its sociological context.” (1973, 63)  “The existing economic, political, and 
sociological factors,” Ellul continues, “progressively allow an ideology to penetrate 
individuals or masses.” (1973, 63-4)  Sociological propaganda operates in a much more 
subtle fashion than propaganda with an overt message, e.g. an advertisement saying “buy 
Budweiser,” a campaign leaflet reading “Trump is evil,” or a bumper sticker reading 
“guns don’t kill, people do.”  Such instances of direct propaganda have clear goals that 
they are intended to accomplish.  On the other hand, sociological propaganda is 
spontaneous and “not the result of deliberate propaganda action.” (Ellul, 1973, 64) 
 Examples will help clarify.  I will start with the example provided by Ellul and 
then provide a few of my own.  According to Ellul, much sociological propaganda gets 
transmitted through film: 
When an American producer makes a film, he has certain definite ideas he 
wants to express, which are not intended to be propaganda.  Rather, the 
propaganda element is in the American way of life with which he is 
permeated and which he expresses in his film without realizing it.  (64) 
Having been brought up within the American milieu, the producer could not help but to 
have adopted a certain set of internal elements (attitudes) that reflect the social, 
economic, and political realities in which he grew up.  These internal elements include 
value systems, stereotypes, beliefs about society, and even certain beliefs about what a 
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film should depict.  This list is not exhaustive.  Inevitably, the film will be permeated 
with the ideas and values of the producer in ways of which the producer is not fully 
conscious.  This effectively reproduces the same internal elements within the minds of 
the filmgoers. 
 I suggest that sociological propaganda can operate in even more subtle ways to 
integrate the recipient into the social body.  Instead of being inadvertently permeated with 
the value system of the creator, sociological propaganda can also work by reflecting the 
current social, economic, or political reality.  This reflection leads to the inculcation of 
certain attitudes.  Consider, for example, a romance film that depicts the blossoming 
relationship of a man and a woman.  Obviously, the overt message of the film is one of 
entertainment, i.e. it seeks to entertain the audience.  In this sense, the film is a piece of 
direct propaganda.  The film, however, is saturated with certain ideals about romantic 
love.  By consuming this film, filmgoers also consume those ideals about romance and 
love. 
 More propagandistic messages saturate the film.  How does the couple travel to 
their date?  Do they travel by public transportation, private car, Segway, or walking?  
Unless it is needed as a plot device, the transportation system will likely be whichever 
resonates most with the filmmaker, and this will be the product of the images he has seen 
and the experiences he has had.  This choice has large stakes.  Because of the film’s large 
distribution, the couple’s transportation choices will become contributions to the 
audience’s milieu.  As such, it will serve to habituate the audience to that form of 
transportation.  Importantly, neither the propagation of the ideals of romantic love nor the 
habituation to certain forms of transportation is the intended goal of the film.  The film 
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seeks to take the audience’s money, leave them with a positive outlook to take to their 
friends, and, perhaps, lead the audience to a particular conclusion about a problem in the 
romantic sphere.  But, these goals are built on assumptions and stereotypes about how 
romance, love, and even transportation occur in society. 
 One might argue that sociological propaganda, as I have described it, could not be 
an effective tool for integration.  While the couple’s transportation choices may have 
some effect on the attitudes of the audience, that effect would be so imperceptible as to 
be negligible.  This line of argumentation fails to recognize the breadth of sociological 
propaganda.  The romance film likely will not have a dramatic effect on the audience’s 
attitudes towards transportation, but I argue, the repetition of the images will.  That films, 
in general, are saturated with images of automobiles and that automobile and automotive 
advertisements dominate the media landscape operate to inculcate pro-automobile 
attitudes within the population.  In this way, sociological propaganda becomes more 
effective when it accords with other propagandistic messages (both direct and 
sociological) that operate within a particular population. 
 The lack of intention is a key component to sociological propaganda.  By this I 
mean the presenter of the image did not intend for attitudes at issue to be inculcated 
within the audience.  In the case of my example, the filmmaker did not intend to spread 
certain ideas about transportation when making his film.  Surely, the filmmaker intended 
to have his subjects take a particular form of transportation, but the effect of its inclusion 
is an unintended byproduct. 
 We find another element of sociological propaganda in Clifford G. Christians 
1995 article “Propaganda and the Technological System,” in which he discusses the 
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concept.  “As its primary network,” he writes, “propaganda uses a horizontal interaction 
between individuals through which to establish collective standards, peer pressure, and 
group norms.” (162)  The term “horizontal” comes from Ellul, who contrasts it with 
“vertical propaganda.”  According to Ellul, “vertical propaganda” is vertical in that “it is 
made by a leader, a technician, a political or religious head who acts from the superior 
position of his authority and seeks to influence the crowd below.” (1973, 79-80)  
Horizontal propaganda, on the other hand, “is made inside the group (not from the top), 
where, in principle, all individuals are equal and there is no leader.” (1973, 81)  While 
direct, i.e. intentional, propaganda can be either horizontal or vertical, sociological 
propaganda is largely horizontal (Ellul, 1973, 81).  This poses a problem.  In what sense 
can we call a Hollywood film sociological propaganda when there is a clear difference in 
position between the filmmaker and the film’s audience?  It is more useful to think of 
sociological propaganda as horizontal in that it is decentralized.  By decentralized I mean 
that sociological propaganda does not come from a unified source.  Pro-automobile 
attitudes are spread via automobile and automotive advertisements seeking to sell 
automobiles and related products and via Hollywood films that glamorize cars through 
the chase and habituate audiences to their existence by the magnitude of the automobile’s 
presence. 
 At this point, I will advance a definition of sociological propaganda. 
Sociological propaganda:  decentralized communicative acts that 
unintentionally operate to affect the behavior or attitudes of an individual 
by irrational means. 
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That irrationality is a component of sociological propaganda should come as no surprise.  
After all, sociological propaganda is unintentional; any semblance of rationality would 
indicate a clear attempt at influence and, therefore, intention.  “Operate,” here, captures 
the systematic connection between the messages’ production and their effects. 
 In this section, I advanced a definition of sociological propaganda.  Sociological 
propaganda is irrational, decentralized, and operates to affect the behavior and attitudes 
of an individual by irrational means.  If sociological propaganda is a real phenomenon, 
how does it work?  In the next section, I will draw together threads from Rae Langton’s 
work on pornography and advance a model for how sociological propaganda works. 
IV.  How Sociological Propaganda Works 
 If sociological propaganda is a real phenomenon, then we need a model to explain 
how sociological propaganda affects the behaviors and attitudes of its recipients.  This 
section looks at two possible candidates.  First, the section will examine Jason Stanley’s 
mechanism for how propaganda works.  Second, this section will draw together threads 
from Rae Langton’s model for how pornography silences and subordinates women 
(1993).  As we shall see, Stanley’s mechanism cannot account for propagandistic images.  
On the other hand, if Langton’s model succeeds with pornography, then we can extend it 
to art and film. 
 Central to Stanley’s mechanism for how propaganda works is the distinction 
between at-issue content and not-at-issue content.  According to Stanley, the at-issue 
content is “what is at issue in the debate”; the at-issue content is “the information asserted 
by [an] utterance.” (2015, 134)  To assert at-issue content is “to propose to add it to the 
common ground” of information in a particular linguistic context (2015, 134).  In 
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contrast, not-at-issue content is “not advanced as a proposal of a content to be added to 
the common ground”; rather, the not-at-issue content is “directly added to the common 
ground.” (2015, 135)  Consider one of Stanley’s examples: 
It was John who solved the problem (2015, 135). 
The message asserts that John solved the problem.  This is the at-issue content.  The 
message presupposes that the problem has been solved.  This is the not-at-issue content. 
 The at-issue/not-at-issue content distinction leads Stanley to propose two distinct 
models of how propaganda works: 
Content model of propaganda:  one kind of paradigmatic propaganda in a 
liberal democracy would have a normal at-issue content that seems 
reasonable, and would also have a not-at-issue content that is not 
reasonable. 
Expressive model of propaganda:  one kind of paradigmatic propaganda in 
a liberal democracy would have a normal at-issue content that seems 
reasonable, and would also have a not-at-issue effect that would decrease 
the empathy for a group.  (2015, 140) 
Stanley takes “reasonableness” to be one of the primary ideals of liberal democracies 
(2015, 81).  This concludes my outline of Stanley’s mechanism for how propaganda 
works.  Leaving aside his two types of propaganda (supporting and undermining), his 
mechanism includes two types of content (at-issue and not-at-issue) and two possible 
models for how propaganda works (the content model and the expressive model).  Can 
Stanley’s framework account for sociological propaganda? 
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 In a review of Stanley’s book, Jonathan Wolff argues that Stanley’s reliance on 
the at-issue/not-at-issue distinction comes with a cost:  Stanley’s analysis cannot be 
extended to images (2016, 558-9).  Stanley does admit that his mechanisms are incapable 
of explaining how images work in propagandistic ways (2015, 127).  Consider, for 
example, Hubert Lanzinger’s 1935 painting Der Bannerträger (“The Standard Bearer”).  
It depicts Adolf Hitler wearing plate armor, riding a black horse, and holding the Nazi 
flag in his right hand.  Imbued with set-pieces of a medieval knight, Lanzinger depicts 
Hitler as a heroic warrior and leader of the German people.  The painting depicts the 
ideals of heroism and will either increase or erode the realization of that ideal.  As such, 
Stanley’s propaganda types can account for the painting as a propagandistic message.  
Our analysis breaks down when we try to ascertain the at-issue content and the not-at-
issue content of the painting.  What is the at-issue content of the painting?  The painting 
shows Hitler as a hero, but it does not propose to add this “fact” to the common ground.  
Instead, the painting presupposes that Hitler is a hero.  It seems, then, that the painting is 
purely not-at-issue content. 
 Having shown that Stanley’s mechanisms explaining how propaganda works 
cannot account for images, can Stanley’s types of propaganda account for sociological 
propaganda?  Seemingly not.  Sociological propaganda is unintentional and, therefore, 
does not present itself as embodying any ideal.  Let us return to the example of 
pornography.  Does pornography present itself as embodying a certain ideal?  Perhaps, it 
claims to embody the ideals of sexiness.  If so, does it support or undermine the 
realization of that ideal?  This seems impossible to answer.  Sexual tastes vary widely 
among individuals.  Or, consider a film that takes place in the suburbs of a large city.  
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Everyone travels via car.  Such a film works as propaganda in that it normalizes the car as 
a form of transportation, but it does not do so by presenting itself as the embodiment of 
an ideal.  The film simply reflects selected aspects of reality; through that reflection, 
ideas, stereotypes, and expectations are inculcated and reinforced. 
 Let us now turn to the work of Rae Langton.  Langton argues that certain kinds of 
pornography “work as a kind of propaganda” when they “help to form and propagate 
certain views about women and sexuality.” (1990, 335)  To explain how this works, 
Langton and Caroline West draw from the work of David Lewis and argue that a rule of 
accommodation operates in the context of pornography (1999, [8]).  During normal 
conversations, the rule works in the following way: 
If at a given time something is said that requires a component of 
conversational score to be a certain way, in order for what is said to be 
true, or otherwise acceptable; and if that component is not that way 
beforehand (and if certain further conditions hold); then at that time, that 
score component changes in the required way, to make what is said true, 
or otherwise acceptable. (1999, [7]) 
This means that if in a conversation a statement that makes a presupposition goes 
unchallenged, the information that is presupposed gets added to the conversational score, 
i.e. the presuppositions get added to our pool of common knowledge.  Langton and West 
extend the rule of accommodation to pornography: 
While it may not explicitly be said in pornography that women are 
inferior, or that sexual violence is normal or legitimate, it may be that 
propositions like these are presupposed by what pornography explicitly 
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says, because they are required for the hearer to make best sense of what is 
said.  (1999, [8-9]) 
Langton and West use a ‘favorable’ rape depiction as an example.  Imagine a 
pornographic scene in which a woman repeatedly refuses the sexual advances of a man.  
During the rape the follows, the woman is overcome with ecstasy.  Although the scene 
never explicitly states that the woman wanted to be raped and that “no” meant “yes,” 
“these presuppositions are required in order to make sense of what is explicitly said and 
illustrated.” (Langton & West, 1999, [9]) 
 Langton offers the following general scheme of accommodation: 
If – (1. Utterance) – at time t something is said […]; and 
(2. Requirement) – a score component is required to be a certain way […], 
in order for what is said to be correct play […]; and 
(3. Counterfactual Dependence) – the component would not otherwise be 
that way at t, though it was that way before; and 
(4. Conditions) – certain conditions hold […]; then 
(5. Creation) – at t the score component is that certain way […], enabling 
what is said to be correct play […]  (2015, 15-6) 
I argue that we adopt a similar framework for imagistic forms of communication.  By 
“correct play” Langton means a kind of success condition; this could be acceptability, 
truth, or Austin’s notion of “felicity” (2015, 5).  In the case of images, we can use a 
principle of coherence such that the elements of the image must hang together in a 
logically connected way.  Langton’s Counterfactual Dependence offers a modal 
alternative to Lewis’s (1979) Novelty condition, i.e. that the component wasn’t that way 
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before.  Either one will work for our scheme.  At times, sociological propaganda will 
create new components (Novelty); at others, it will strengthen or sustain existing ones 
(Counterfactual Dependence).  The condition that must hold is authority.  For 
accommodation to be successful, the speaker must have authority over the message’s 
recipient (Langton, 2015, 4).  With my proposed adjustments, the scheme for imagistic 
accommodation follows: 
If – (1. Image Presentation) – at time t an image is presented […]; and 
(2. Requirement) – a score component is required to be a certain way […], 
in order for what is depicted to be correct play […]; and 
(3.) – either Novelty or Counterfactual Dependence holds; and 
[(3.1 Novelty) – the component wasn’t that way before; or 
(3.2 Counterfactual Dependence) – the component would not 
otherwise be that way at t, though it was that way before] 
(4. Conditions) – certain conditions hold […]; then 
(5. Creation) – at t the score component is that certain way […], enabling 
what is depicted to be correct play […] 
We can then model Langton and West’s “favorable” rape depiction using my scheme: 
If – (1. Image Presentation) – at time t an image is presented [a favorable 
rape depiction, i.e. a woman is shown enjoying being raped]; and 
(2. Requirement) – a score component is required to be a certain way [The 
woman wanted to be raped; her “no” really meant “yes”], in order for 
what is depicted to be correct play [a coherent image]; and 
(3.) – either Novelty or Counterfactual Dependence holds; and 
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[(3.1 Novelty) – the component wasn’t that way before; or 
(3.2 Counterfactual Dependence) – the component would not 
otherwise be that way at t, though it was that way before] 
(4. Conditions) – certain conditions hold [The image’s presenter has 
authority]; then 
(5. Creation) – at t the score component is that certain way [The woman 
wanted to be raped; her “no” really meant “yes”], enabling what is 
depicted to be correct play [a coherent image] 
The model can also account for even more subtle forms of sociological propaganda – 
propaganda that normalizes certain behaviors.  Consider a film or television show in 
which every scene depicts the consumption of cigarettes or other tobacco products.  
Importantly, the characters pay no attention to their consumption.  Our scheme may look 
like the following: 
If – (1. Image Presentation) – at time t an image is presented [the 
unchallenged consumption of cigarettes is depicted]; and 
(2. Requirement) – a score component is required to be a certain way [the 
consumption of cigarettes is normal/uncontroversial], in order for what is 
depicted to be correct play [a coherent image]; and 
(3.) – either Novelty or Counterfactual Dependence holds; and 
[(3.1 Novelty) – the component wasn’t that way before; or 
(3.2 Counterfactual Dependence) – the component would not 
otherwise be that way at t, though it was that way before] 
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(4. Conditions) – certain conditions hold [The image’s presenter has 
authority]; then 
(5. Creation) – at t the score component is that certain way [consuming 
cigarettes is normal and acceptable], enabling what is depicted to be 
correct play [a coherent image] 
Because the Novelty clause is not essential, the image does not need to create new 
attitudes.  Instead, it can reinforce existing ones. 
 We must remember that this propagandistic message does not exist within a 
vacuum.  How propagandistic messages play off each other is important.  Imagine a 
brutal senate campaign in which each of the two major candidates accuses the other of 
being corrupt, of using their current office to benefit members of their family, and of 
failing to be representative of “the issues voters care about.”  A voter who receives both 
of these direct propaganda messages may conclude that neither candidate is “right for the 
job.”  If third-party candidates receive little to no media exposure, the voter may think he 
has only two bad options and may ultimately decide not to vote.  Similarly, sociological 
propaganda messages play off each other.  Consider a film with a stereotypical 
representation of a gay man.  He is effeminate, flamboyant, and overtly sexual.  If it 
exists in isolation, the film forces us to accommodate this representation by adopting a 
component like the following:  at least one gay man is effeminate, flamboyant, and 
overtly sexual.  The film, though, does not exist in isolation.  Instead, the film exists 
within an array of messages in which gay men are depicted as effeminate, flamboyant, 
and overtly sexual.  As a result, the component added via accommodation will look like 
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the following:  all gay men are effeminate, flamboyant, and overtly sexual; or, gay men 
just are effeminate, flamboyant, and overtly sexual. 
 Thus far I have assumed that the images (or their presenters) have the authority to 
force these types of accommodations.  Accommodation, for Langton, represents an 
illocutionary act of speech, i.e. accommodation is an act “a speaker performs ‘in saying’ 
something.” (2015, 3)  Without the right kind of authority, an illocutionary act cannot be 
performed.  Without the right kind of authority, accommodation fails.  Do art and film 
possess the authority to make illocutionary accommodations? 
 Langton and West provide a reason to be skeptical but offer a refutation (1999, 
[13]).  If the accommodation is made by a fictional image, is not the resulting component 
fictional as well?  If, during the course of a film, a person shoots a beam of light from a 
wooden rod, accommodation leads us to adopt the belief that magic is real.  But, this new 
belief in magic does not extend to the real world; it remains isolated to the fictional world 
to which the film gives us access.  This argument, however, understates our ability to 
learn from fiction.  We tell fairy tales to our children to impart moral knowledge.  We 
watch period dramas to see what life was like centuries ago.  “If we can gain true beliefs 
from fiction,” Langton and West write, “we can also gain false beliefs from fiction.” 
(1999, [13])  This intuition seems correct.  As they note, the majority of fiction is built on 
background conditions that are purported to be true in order to lend realism to the 
fictional representation.  Langton and West call these “background propositions, 
propositions which (whether implicit or explicit) are true in the fiction, and true in the 
world as well.” (1999, [14])  These background propositions lend credibility to a film or 
work of art that seeks to make commentary on some aspect of the real world.  If the 
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audience takes the background propositions of a film or artwork to be true representations 
of reality, the audience accepts them as authoritative. 
 Problematic cases arise when the background propositions are false but purported 
to be true (background lies) or when distinguishing between the factual background 
propositions and the fictional elements is difficult (background blurring) (Langton & 
West, 1999, [14-15]).  The myth that all black men are well endowed can be seen as 
stemming from either of the two situations.  It could be the case the pornography with 
‘hung’ black male characters presents the falsehood as a true background proposition.  It 
also might be that such pornography blurs the distinction between the background 
propositions and the fictional elements.  In such pornographic images it is unclear 
whether the ‘hung’ black male trope is a background proposition or a fictional element.  
Either way, such pornography results in the inculcation of sexual stereotypes about black 
men through the accommodation process. 
 Importantly, sociological propaganda is not limited to artworks and films in which 
background lies or background blurring occurs.  Even when all of the background 
propositions are true, sociological propaganda works to integrate its recipients within 
their social, economic, and political realities.  Let us return to the beer commercial 
described by Maya Gallo.  The commercial depicts friends enjoying beer around a 
campfire.  Such a scene has certainly happened in the real world.  The process of 
accommodation might lead the recipient to adopt the belief that such behavior is normal 
or desirable.  In this way, sociological propaganda, through the process of 
accommodation, can integrate its recipients within their social, economic, and political 
structures.  The recipients adopt attitudes that hold those structures to be normal. 
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 If images demand accommodations be made by their audiences and if 
accommodations require authority for their success, then sociological propaganda works 
only if its recipients give its constituent messages authority.  How much authority (i.e. its 
strength and breadth) affects how sociological propaganda affects its recipients.  
Sociological propaganda messages exhibit epistemic authority.  Speakers have this kind 
of authority based on their expertise and credibility (Langton, 2015, 18).  If the audience 
believes an imagistic message is built on true background propositions, the audience will 
grant the message authority not only over the fictional world it depicts but also over the 
aspects of the real world covered by those background propositions.  These could include 
human behaviors, defining characteristics of certain classes of people, and even how 
humans interact with each other.  The effect can be normalizing activities, reinforcing 
attitudes, and sustaining stereotypes. 
 This section has offered a mechanism for how sociological propaganda works.  If 
sociological propaganda is a real phenomenon, accommodation can explain how it works 
to inculcate and reinforce attitudes within its recipients.  Imagistic accommodation occurs 
when certain components must be adopted in order for the elements within an image to 
cohere in a logically connected way.  Accommodation only succeeds if the image is 
granted authority. 
Conclusion 
 Sociological propaganda is a decentralized communication phenomenon that 
operates unintentionally to irrationally change the behaviors and attitudes of its recipient.  
The accumulation of messages that demand certain accommodations leads to the 
inculcation and strengthening of certain attitudes.  In order for this accommodation to be 
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successful, the recipients of these messages must give the images authority over a real 
world.  Without this authority, accommodation fails completely or succeeds only within 
the fictional world to which the messages give the audience access.  If the 
accommodation model of sociological propaganda is true, it behooves us as a society to 
place a greater emphasis on media literacy.  We must become active consumers of media 
and critically analyze the authority of the images in which we bathe.  Furthermore, we 
must be aware of the more subtle ways in which art and film can influence our attitudes 
and behaviors. 
 This paper has worked to decouple propaganda from intention and has posited a 
new type of propaganda – sociological propaganda.  Additionally, the paper has shown 
that because they rely on a notion of intention, the models of propaganda advanced by 
Jacques Ellul (1973), Sheryl Tuttle Ross (2002), and Jason Stanley (2015) cannot account 
for sociological propaganda.  That propaganda can be unintentional does not mean that 
any irrational and influential message counts as propaganda; rather, a systematic 
connection must hold between the message’s production and its effects.  Edward S. 
Herman and Noam Chomsky’s (2002) political economic model provides an explanation 
for the structural conditions that give rise to some sociological propaganda.  They have 
highlighted one of the ways this systematic connection can be instantiated, but many 
more exist.  Finally, the paper developed the accommodation model of sociological 
propaganda by extending Rae Langton’s work on pornography to other types of imagistic 
communication. 
 The accommodation model of sociological propaganda represents a starting point.  
How sociological propaganda plays out through the internet must be explored if we want 
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to understand how the internet has changed our attitudes.  The accommodation model of 
propaganda may also help explain how we have become so politically polarized.  Media 
consumption patterns have fragmented.  It is possible that, as a result, different groups of 
people have been the recipients of radically different sociological propaganda systems.  
These radically different sociological propaganda systems may have inculcated radically 
different attitudes within their recipients.  I do not propose to provide answers for all of 
these questions, but I hope the accommodation model of sociological propaganda has 
been a step in the right direction.  
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